Monday, May 6

The Arab Spring killed Al Qaida

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For nearly a century, authoritarian rule fed extremist views throughout the area and while death and mayhem dominated contemporary Middle Eastern histories, the glorious and still unfolding Arab Spring confirmed the failures of Islamist governments whether dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood or similar parties. It was not premature to conclude that in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Lebanon and even in Syria, Arab men and women rejected authoritarianism for good. Boisterous democratising voices emerged as well in Iran, Turkey and Afghanistan. Even revolutionary Kurdish populations in Syria and Iraq literally reshaped their ties with perceived threats.

Under the circumstances, it was not hasty to imply that through sheer audacity, men and women of goodwill literally killed Al Qaida and similar fly-by-night operations. Lest one forget, Al Qaida saw the light of day in a New York Courtroom, even if its sensational attacks were conducted from Afghanistan and Yemen. Decapitated to its core, the organisation was now a threat to itself and hardly anyone else. To be sure, many perceived that type of extremism as feeding the inevitable clashes of civilisations frenzy, especially along religious divisions. Instant experts concluded that confessional tensions were not about to go away just because of goodwill, which was certainly correct, though conveniently exaggerated.

Everyone’s attention focused on the various groups that emerged during the past decade and that feed otherwise stale news cycles that thrived on scandal and melodrama, though none of them carried Al Qaida’s epochal menace. In Syria, for example, we now have Jabhat Al Nusra and Ahrar Al Sham that competed with hundreds of similar outfits that were set up on an ad hoc basis by former prisoners or renegade soldiers or even a few foreign mercenaries. We may soon see Mujahideen Idlib or Jihadi Latakiyyah, which will be gobbled-up by beady-eyed reporters eager to recount the latest outrages that highlighted confessional, sectarian, political and military achievements — no matter how ephemeral.

It should be acknowledged that we are now challenged more or less on a regular basis with mundane Sunni-Shiite clashes, periodically supplemented by Salafist-Takfiri-Muslim Brotherhood extremists opposed to the contradictory alliance between an Iranian inspired velayat-e-faqih and the secularist Baath ideology. This was just in Syria and Lebanon. Similar groupings existed in other countries.

Still, while extremists relied on religion or, more accurately, stressed their interpretation of Sharia law as being the correct one, huge differences emerged between all of these groups and hundreds of millions of believers. Even in the supposedly secular Turkish Republic, allegedly the “model” of a moderate Islamist government under the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi or AKP), the Gezi Park attacks showed Prime Minister Recep Tayyib Erdogan’s mantle. The concern that Ankara could slide so deep into authoritarianism was not foreseen just a few months ago.

Of course, developments in Tunisia and Egypt revealed the level of dissatisfaction far better than elsewhere, as Al Nahda and the Brotherhood were slowly emasculated. In Tunis, Prime Minister Hamadi Jabali resigned in February this year to appease masses of discontented secularists, when the murder of Shukri Belaid, a secularist political leader, mobilised hundreds of thousands. In fact, Islamist rule was headed for a surprisingly nonviolent demise in Tunis, while chances that a new constitution would be adopted were excellent, which further sealed the fate of those who wished to monopolise power.

Ideological beliefs

Likewise, the latest Egyptian military coup could not and will not overshadow the failures of the Brotherhood. Rather than emphasise ideological moderation that would, over time, pave the way for a stronger democratising society, Mohammad Mursi and his cohorts aspired towards aggressiveness. Such belligerence stood out during the past two years, as extremists engaged in full-fledged internecine hostilities where loyalties, ethnic affiliations, past membership and even ideological beliefs were all tossed out of the proverbial political window.

Instead, Arabs confronted Sunni-Shiite tensions pretty much everywhere, witnessed extremists fight each other within a same sect in Iran, Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Sudan and several other countries and otherwise noted clear divisions that tore fragile seams that held these societies together. Millions of ordinary men and women who craved liberty and worked towards prosperity understood that chimerical promises, whether earthy or divine, would not deliver them from authoritarianism.

Though difficult to see through the fog of sensational coverage that aggrandises lunatic fringes to spread their venom, there was plenty of good news, led by the wonderful observation that extremist ideologies were no longer acceptable to a vast majority that sought peace and decency. Intolerance and xenophobia were out and it was amply evident that Arab and Muslim civilisations were safe from the temporary damage that fringe elements caused. Like most extremist groups, Al Qaida could only conduct acts of violence or accede to power, but then fail miserably, since there was no unity or a nation-building vision.

While dissension among opposition movements were not unusual, the very inabilities for self-appointed leaders from working with each other ensured that nothing substantive could ever come out of stale agendas. That was not what most folks wanted from their leaders and it should come as no surprise that the overwhelming majority of Arabs and Muslims have turned their backs on such groups.

Millions of ordinary people, who craved liberty and worked towards prosperity, understood that chimerical promises won’t deliver them from authoritarianism

 

By Joseph A. Kechichian | Senior Writer
Gulf News

Dr Joseph A. Kechichian is an author, most recently of Legal and Political Reforms in Saudi Arabia (London: Routledge, 2013).

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